LIFE 01' G.UUBJ.LDI.

be so well pleased with it, is a moot point. Since the treaty of Villa­
franca, Garibaldi has not attempted to conceal his disappointment at the
result of French interference, and thongh grateful for what the emperor
effec.ted, he could not endnre the idea that this gave him a right to regu­
late the intllrnal affairs of Italy. Louis Napoleon has now received . his
reward ; S:11.voy and Nice are in his possession, and Victor Emanuel
may be saiely permitted to walk without leading-strings. It may be
that furthe:r sacrifices, such as the cession of the island of Sardinia, will
be demandE1d of him, to soothe the tender susceptibilities of the
but even that would be a cheap price to pay for the liberation of Italy.

We are iin hopes, then, that Garibaldi will be allowed to work out the
problem in the way he has already commenced ; that he has frightful
difficulties tc contend with we willingly concede, and, uoleAs some defec­
tion take place among the Neapolitan troops, the reduction of Messina
will.be a tw1k almost beyond his strength. The Neapolitan navy, too, is
very strong, and may prevent him for the present completing his designs ;
but humanly speaking, we have not the least doubt but that the bravl'
partizan will achieve entire success. Much is to be hoped by a diversion
in his favolllr in Naples, but it is almost too much to expect that down­
trodden nation to rise, unless with certainty of success. For ten years
they have endured a martyrdom which apparently imperilled their
existence u a people, and the vitality has been crushed out of them by
the massaore or imprisonment of all the leading liberals.

There is one consolation to be gathered from Garibaldi's descent on
Sicily ; that t4e great powers will be compelled to interfere acti,·cly in
the Italian question, and that the independence of that glorious country
will no longer be left at the mercy of French intriguants. By declining
to guarantE1e the possession of the .1Emilia by Sardinia, the Emperor of
the French granted Victor Emanuel liberty of action, and, if he in­
crease his t'erritory, it will be at his own risk and peril. Italy is in a
state of profound agitation, and the King of Sardinia must place himself
at the hcadl of the popular movE'ment, or pave the way for further dis­
sension: whose consequences have ever proved so lamentable. He is
perfectly safe in taking such a step; for Austria would hardly dare to
cross her frontier, and leal·e insurrect-ion rampant behind her. As for
the Papalini, there is no occasion to fen.r them, el·cn with the redoubtable
LamoriricrE' at their head ; for, if the French garrison be withdrawn from
Rome, the people can hold the troops in check as they did before.

And to this we think that it must come ere long: the pressure of

public opinion will compel Louis Napoleon to abandon the cause of a

LIFE OF GUIBJ.LDI.

PontiE, on whom all the best meaning exhortations are thro11'11 away.
Pio N ono had a grand opportunity of becoming head of the Italian
Confederation: fortunately for oivilzation, he allowed it to slip from his
grasp, and the consequences will be on his own head. If Italy once
become re-united, as there is every reaaon to believe, history underrates
Rome a.s the capital, and Victor Emanuel is quite prepared to endure
the Pap1ml thunder for such a prize. All that will then remain will be
the liberation of Venetia, but we do not consider that a very difficult
task. 1;Ve allow that Francis Joseph has concentrated an enormous
army there, and is wreaking his spite for the loss of Lombardy on the
hapless population, but there aro mauifest signs that the Emperor of
Austria will be compelled ere long to set his own house in order, and
leave the question of Italy to be settled by wiser heads than his. It is
Tery poe1sible that, with the innate obstinacy of the Hapsburgs, he may
attempt a desperate struggle. But, if he do so, his own lands will be
dismembered, and he will lose, not only Venetia, now hardly worth
keeping,. but also Hungary; who baa a bitter vengeance to take for
c enturies of tyranny and wrong-doing.

Altogether, then, we consider the condition of Italy most encouraging,
for Garibaldi has boldly cut the gordian knot of diplomacy. Nothing
can now prevent the contest, and we think we have shown sufficiently
in the p1•eceding pages that Garibaldi is not the man to allow hitnself to
be daunted by even apparently insuperable difficulties. The chieftain
who checked the advance of the Freneh at Rome, will find it an easy
task to the Neapolitan troops wherever he meets them ; and even
the stonte walls behind which they cower, will prove but a slight obstacle
to his And when we read of General Lanza mercile1111ly
bombarcling Palermo, our blood is in a glow, and we hailed with delight
the message announcing that the ruthless soldiery have sought
shelter board their fleet.

But whnte'rer may be the result of the invasion, it will not lessen or
increase the admiration, all must feel, for tlre great Italian who stands
at the head of the movement. Garibaldi has gi'l"en &o many proofs of
his prowess, that one more or less is of little consequence, and a victory
O'l'cr the Neapolitan troops cannot add to his renown. But, if there be
onr quality more admirable about him than another, it is the constancy
w i th which he has adhered to his programme-the independence of
Ita ly. ]During the gloomy months that followed the treaty of Villa­
franca, too many of the patriots swer'l'ed from their allegiance to liberty,
but Garibaldi remained true to himself. Persuasion and menace were