30 LIFE 01r GlliBA.LDI.

ried too a length, Garibaldi appears rather the chief of an Indian
tribe tha:n a general; but, on the approach of danger, and at the head of
his combatants, his presence of mind and·courage are truly admirable ;
and then, by the astonishing rapidity of·;8is movements, he compensates
in great measure for tb.e lack of those·qualmes generally supposed to be
in a good general."

On thE' day after his cvictory, Garibaldi remained encamped on the
plains surrounding Pa.lesm.a. .:At length, seeing that the Neapolitans
made no .arrangementll'm the attack, he suspected that they and
the had arrurged to Dome.Juring hia absence. Hence
he determined to hurry liiMk ·at onee and .·mwr the city, and on the
night of May 10, his men .began their march. :eassing within two miles
of the Ellitemy, .d ad'1111ncing by the most impracticable roads, they
traversed a distance oftwenty-eight miles, without a moment's halt. They
had scame Rome-\'\f:hen, on the alarm being given, they were
sent advanced posts of Monte.:.Mario, where they remained
for fum-d1tys. I twas at this period that M. de'Le811eps arrived, andallfear

' of'GIJ" o:ffeui:re mov-.t on the part ef·GeJlleral Oudinot being dis­
pillifd, iJne Romans ttmled their exclusive attention to the Neapolitans

B:t-e b1-,igaiies of infanty, one of ca'\<alry, andtwelve. guns, were sent
'Neapolitans, who continued to occupy V elletri,. Albano, and
:Biiea:tria!;L. 'nis force, amounting to about 14,000 men, formed of

> lltllilile!!ed detachments recalled from the provinces, marched in the
..

of Monte Fortino, menacing a.ll the tlllemy's communications.
JAt first it was proposed to ·give the command•in-chief to Garibaldi, but
the Guerillero, with his usual modesty, declined. the honour, alleging his
slight-seielllti.fie acquaintance· with the art of war. Hence he preferred a
setlllllliiary poat. The little army was then wtder the command of Pietro
Reselli, though the influence of Garibaldi's name was so great that he
was as the chief of the army, just as he had ever
been comlidered the right a:rm of the defence of Rome. The advanced
guard, after . a .lmrried InftCh, -encamped, on May 16, upon the hills
defending the.lWeatrilla. llllii.Alemo roads. The enemy were acquainted
with Dl'()Vements, and •CJCIIIeentrated their fGrces at Velletri, where
the kiag ·was. 'The.:&omans resolved on occupying Monte Fortino at
once, but the want of·transport delayed the distribution of rations, and
consequeiJttly the advance movement of the troops. Still, on the evening
of the 19th, the vanguard occupied Monte Fortino; the centre, formed
ofthe'second and third brigades, encamped between Monte Fortino and

V almonte, wlwe the fourth brigacie, with the cavalry and artillery, was held
in reserve at the latter place. On the morning of the 20th the vanguard
marched on V elletri, but the centre, owing to various obstacles, was
delayed longer than it should have been, and remained too far in the
rear. The ·va-nguard, commanded by Colonel Marochetti, and with
which was G1u-ibaldi, took up a position a mile from V elletri, to await the
rest of the troops, but theNeapolitans did not give them time to come up.
A squadron of cavalry and an infantry column left the town and came to
attack the republicans, but were so warmly received, that they fell back
in spite of their numerical superiority, after losing a large
number in killed and wounded, and leaving several prisoners in the hands
of their advex"Saries. A few hours later the Roman cavalry arrived, and
after them tlh.e third brigade, commanded by Colonel Galetti. The city
waa invested by the republicans, but it was surrounded by a wide and
deep moat, the Neapolitan artillery kept up a brisk fire from the
Capuchin heights, situated above the camp. After a vain attempt at
assault, night put an end the combat.

About two the morning, some volunteers, sent out to reconnoitre,
glided beneath the ramparts. The complete silence that prevailed
astounded them; they climbed the gates, and found the city apparently
deserted. Some laggards were taken prisoners, and soon afterwards the
inhabitants gladly emerged from their houses. They narrated the details
of the sudde'n withdrawal. The Neapolitans had commenced their
retreat, we 11hould say their flight, just after nightfall. The vigorous
pursuit of th.e morning had thrown the troops into such a panic, that no
exhortation could persude them to face once again the terrible Garibaldi.
A pressing dnnger for Ferdinand II. sprang from this refusal, for we are
told that he would have fellen into the hands of his enemies, had he delayed
his retreat for an hour longer. This gallant exploit cost the Romans about
one hundred killed and wounded, and the enemy's loss was much more
considerable. But the principal result of the victory was that, two days
later, the whole N capolitan army had re-crossed the frontiers. Ferdinand
thought to gain an easy victory over the young militia ofthe Republic,
but he only obtained the disgrace of a defeat, in spite of his superiority
of numbers.

Garibaldi set out in pursuit of theNeapolitans, but they fled so hurriedly
that, for all his agility, he could not catch them up. He then re·joined
his column, one half of which returned to Rome, while the other half
proceeded to the provinces of Frosinone of the armed bands of one
Zucchi, a mont zealous adherent of the papal government. The applause

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